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Article 3

The Future of Municipal Regulation

of Cable Television:
Plugged In or Tuned Out?
FredricD. Tannenbaum*
INTRODUCTION

The cable television' industry is subject to a maze of concurrent federal, state and local regulation. 2 The federal government,
through the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"),:' actively regulates the cable television industry and establishes
guidelines for the regulation of cable television by state and local
authorities. The State of Illinois, through the Illinois Commerce
Commission ("ICC"), initially asserted direct jurisdiction over
cable television franchises. 4 A decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court, 5 however, has relegated the ICC to indirect regulation.

Illinois municipalities have statutory authority to license, franchise and tax cable television companies. 6 However, two recent

*Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, Civil Appeals Division, formerly in the Public
Utilities Division; B.A. 1978, Ohio Wesleyan University; J.D. 1981, University of Wisconsin. The opinions of the author do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Attorney
General of the State of Illinois.
1. The FCC defines a cable system as:
A non-broadcast facility consisting of a set of transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment, under common
ownership and control, that distributes or is designed to distribute to subscribers the signals of one or more television broadcast stations, but such term shall
not include (1) any such facility that serves fewer than 50 subscribers, or (2) any
such facility that serves or will serve only subscribers in one or more multiple
unit dwellings under common ownership, control or management.
47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1982).
2. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.30-.31 (1982); TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459, 464 (D.
Nev. 1968), aff'd, 396 U.S. 556 (1970).
3. The FCC was created for the purpose of regulating communication by wire and
radio in interstate and foreign commerce. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1976).
4. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
5. Illinois-Indiana Cable Television Ass'n v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d
205, 302 N.E.2d 334 (1973).
6. ILL. REFv. STAT. ch. 24, § 1142-11 (1981).
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decisions of the United States Supreme Court 7 have raised serious
questions concerning the continued viability of municipal regulation of cable television because of municipalities' potential
vulnerability to antitrust challenges.
This article will trace the history of the regulation of the cable
television industry by the FCC. It will then discuss and analyze
the Illinois Supreme Court decision which held that the ICC does
not have the authority to regulate cable television directly. Next,
this article will examine the municipalities' role in regulating
cable television. In particular, it will discuss the City of Chicago's regulatory ordinance and analyze whether it exceeds the
FCC's mandatory franchise fee limitations. Finally, this article
will analyze the vulnerability of Illinois municipalities to antitrust liability.
FEDERAL REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION

In the late 1950's, cable television or community antenna television ("CATV") systems were built to strengthen the delivery of
broadcast television signals to homes in predominantly rural
and mountainous areas which were not serviced by network or
local broadcasters. Essentially, the large antennas that CATV
systems provided made reception clearer by enhancing the broadcasters' signals. As the public demand for imported signals grew,
CATV systems increased the number of available channels.,
Additionally, some system operators began to originate programming.
Broadcasters, both local and network, began to view cable television as an economic threat. Consequently, they turned to the
FCC for protection. 9 The Commission, however, determined that

7. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
8. See R.C. SMITH, THE WIREi) NATION 3-4 (1972). Local television dealers provided
much of the impetus for increasing the number of CATV systems in order to boost their
sales of television sets. Dealers would run cables from the community antennas to the
homes of cable subscription purchasers. Note, CA TV FranchiseFee: Incentive for Regulation, Disincentive for Invention, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 741, 744 (1979). The signals typically were strengthened by an amplifier and then fed through a coaxial cable. A modem
coaxial cable can carry 40 channels, FM radio, and computerized information. Dual coaxial cables, found in most large cities, can carry over 100 channels. See generally R.
STEINER, VISIONS OF CABLEVISION (2d ed. 1973).
9. See R. STEINER, supra note 8, at 47. In 1976, some protection was given to broadcasters through the copyright laws. Congress revised the Copyright Act and imposed an
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it had no authority under the Communications Act of 1934
("Act")10 to regulate cable television" because CATV did not
qualify as a common carrier 2 or as a broadcaster.13 Therefore,
the Commission determined that there was no basis for FCC
jurisdiction over cable television.
In 1962, however, the FCC changed its hands-off position
regarding regulation of cable television.' 4 To protect a local
broadcaster from potential economic harm, the FCC denied an

obligation on cable system operators to compensate broadcasters for imported television
signals. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 111, 90 Stat. 2541, 2550 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 11 (1982)). Section 11 l(d) provides for mandatory compensation to broadcasters. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d). For a discussion of the protection afforded broadcasters by the
1976 Copyright Act, see M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 6-11 to 6-18 (rev. ed. 1981).
10. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976). The Act's three relevant subchapters confer wide discretion on the FCC to accept jurisdiction over interstate communications. Subchapter I
details the goals of the Act "to make available. .. a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide... wire
and radio communications service with adequate facilities." Id. § 151. Subchapter II
gives the FCC plenary jurisdiction over common carriers. Id. §§ 201-222. A common carrier is defined in the Act as: "[A] common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy ...
but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so
engaged, be deemed a common carrier." Id. § 153(h). If cable television were classified as
a "common carrier," the Commission could require cable systems to allow full access to
their facilities and to charge set rates for their services. Id. §§ 201, 203, 205. Subchapter
III delineates the FCC's authority over radio and broadcasting. Id. §§ 301-330. The FCC
may license broadcast stations "if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served
thereby." Id. § 307(a).
11. Report and Order, CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Repeater Services I.The FCC concluded:
In essence, the broadcasters' position shakes down the fundamental proposition
that they wish us to regulate in a manner favorable toward them vis-a-vis any
nonbroadcast competitive enterprise. Thus, for example, we might logically be
requested to invoke a prohibition against ...all of the entities which compete
with broadcasting for the time and attention of potential viewers and listeners.
The logical absurdity of such a position requires no elaboration.
Id. at 431-32.
12. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958), aff'd sub nom., Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
13. Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. at 428-29.
14. FCC policies toward regulation of cable television have ranged from hands-off to
pervasive to its present policy of regulation which is coexistent with state and local regulation. Initially, the FCC determined that the Communications Act of 1934 did not confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to regulate cable television. Sixth Report and Order on
Rules Governing Television Broadcast Stations, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952). For a thorough
history of the FCC's changing role in the regulation of cable television, see D. LE Duc,
CABILE TELEVISION AND THE FCC (1973); R.C. SMITH, supra note 8; Shoenberger, The FCC,
Cable TV and Visions of Valhalla:Judicial Scrutiny of Complex Rulemaking and Institutional Competence, 14 U. RICH. L. Rv. 113 (1979); Note, Administrative Law- Communications Law - FCC Authority Over Cable Television, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 962.
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application for permission to construct a microwave radio communication system which would receive distant television signals and transmit them to cable television systems. 15 Thus, the
FCC asserted indirect jurisdiction over cable television operators.
In 1966, the FCC issued its Second Report and Order which
further increased its regulatory scope. 16 This report reflected the
FCC's concern for the potential economic threat which cable television posed to both VHF and UHF broadcasters. The FCC ruled
that if an established broadcast station or a UHF station in the
top 100 television markets 17 objected to a cable television system's importation of distant signals, the cable system would be
barred from importing such signals, absent a showing that the

importation would be consistent with the public interest.18
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 19 the Supreme
Court upheld the FCC's exercise of jurisdiction over cable television as enunciated in the Commission's Second Report and
Order. The Court stated that the FCC was not restricted to regu20
lating common carriers and broadcasters pursuant to the Act.
Rather, the Court noted that the plain wording of section 152(a) of
the Act "conferired] regulatory authority over 'all interstate ...
communications by wire or radio."' 21 Therefore, the Court found
that section 152(a) of the Act conferred on the FCC a grant of
authority broad enough to allow the FCC to regulate cable television.2 2 The Court, however, limited this broad grant of authority. The Court stated as follows:
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of
the Commission's authority to regulate CATV. It is enough
to emphasize that the authority which we recognize today
under § 152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillaryto

15. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 359
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 98 (1963).
16. Second Report and Order, Cable Television, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Second Report].
17. The top 100 television markets are listed in 47 C.F.R. § 76.51 (1982).
18. Second Report, 2 F.C.C.2d at 746. Some commentators argue that the FCC's rules
actually stunted UHF's growth. They reason that the availability of cable television
would have enhanced UHF's weak signals and increased the potential number of UHF
recipients. E.g., R.C. SMITH, supra note 8, at 49-51; Park, Cable Television, UHF Broadcasting and FCC Regulatory Policy, 15 J.L. & EON. 207 (1972).
19. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).

20. Id. at 172.
21. Id. at 173 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976)) (footnote omitted).
22. Id.
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the effective performance of the Commission's various
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcast23
ing.
The FCC seized the Court's affirmation of its jurisdiction over
CATV and conducted hearings to determine how to regulate
cable television in the public interest.2 4 As a result of these hearings, the Commission issued rules requiring CATV systems with
3,500 or more subscribers to originate programming and also to
make facilities available for the local production of programming.2 5 These requirements, the FCC reasoned, would satisfy
the congressional goals underlying the Communications Act of
1934, which were to establish a uniform, national mass media
26
network that had local control and diversity.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Midwest Video
Corp. v. United States,27 held that the program origination rules
promulgated by the FCC exceeded the Commission's authority.
The Supreme Court, in a closely divided opinion, reversed the
Eighth Circuit's decision. 2 The Court stated that the central
issue was whether the FCC's program origination rules were
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of its responsibilities under the Act.2 9 The Court reiterated its holding in Southwestern Cable that the FCC is responsible for preventing CATV
systems from adversely effecting the statutory policies of the
30
Act.
The Court stated that in order to effectuate the goals of the
Act, the FCC had the further responsibility of requiring CATV
systems to affirmatively promote those goals. 3' The Court con-

23. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
24. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. 18,397, 33
Fed. Reg. 19,028,15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Rulemaking and Inquiry].
25. First Report and Order in Docket No. 18,397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
26. Id. at 18, 398, 20 F.C.C.2d at 202. For a discussion of the need for federal regulation of CATV to promote the goals of the Communications Act of 1934, see Note, Regulation of Community Antenna Television, 70 CoI.UM L. REv. 837 (1970).
27. 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
28. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). Four justices joined in
the plurality opinion. The Chief Justice wrote a concurring opinion, and four justices
dissented.
29. Id. at 663 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
30. Id. at 664 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
31. Id. (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). The Court noted that "CATV systems, no less
than broadcast stations, may enhance as well as impair the appropriate provision of
broadcast services." Id. at 664-65 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
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cluded that because the program origination rules promoted a
media network which was diverse and locally controlled the
rules were reasonably ancillary to the FCC's responsibilities, and
32
therefore, did not exceed the FCC's authority.
Four dissenting members of the Court challenged the FCC's
authority to issue the program origination rules. 33 The dissent
distinguished the functions of CATV from the functions of broadcasting, and concluded that the FCC rules were actually "bludgeoning" cable systems into broadcasters. 34 Furthermore, Chief
Justice Burger in his concurring opinion admitted that "[c]andor
requires acknowledgement, for me at least, that the Commission's position strains the outer limits of even the open-ended
and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the
35
Commission and the courts."
The FCC, despite the Court's affirmance of jurisdiction, chose
to repeal the mandatory program origination rules. 36 However,

32. Id. at 667-69 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). The Court has consistently upheld
the FCC's policy of promoting diversity in broadcasting. In 1943, it upheld FCC rules
which sought to diminish network control of local radio program time. The Supreme
Court held that the Communications Act of 1934 afforded the FCC expansive powers to
control the changing and dynamic technology of broadcasting. National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Other Supreme Court decisions have sustained
the FCC's policy of promoting diversity in broadcasting. E.g., FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding FCC rules which prospectively
prohibited common ownership of broadcast stations and newspapers in the same community). See also Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
33. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. at 677 (Douglas. J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 680 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
The upshot of today's decision is to make the Commission's authority over
activities 'ancillary" to its responsibilities greater than its authority over any
broadcast licensee. Of course, the Commission can regulate a CATV that
transmits broadcast signals. But to entrust the Commission with the power to
force some, a few, or all CATV operators into the broadcast business is to give it
a forbidding authority. Congress may decide to do so. But the step is a legislative measure so extreme that we should not find it interstitially authorized in
the vague language of the Act.
Id. at 681 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 676 (Burger, CA., concurring).
36. Report and Order, Cable Television Service, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974). The FCC
reasoned:
The net effect of attempting to require origination has been the expenditure of
large amounts of money for programming that was, in many instances, neither
wanted by subscribers nor beneficial to the system's total operation.... During
the suspension of the mandatory rule, cable operators have used business
judgment and discretion in their origination decisions. For example, some operators have felt compelled to originate programming to attract and retain sub-
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the FCC permitted voluntary program origination by cable oper37
ators.
In 1972, the Commission conducted a study and issued a
report and rules which required mandatory access to cable television systems. 38 The rules required the cable television systems
in the top 100 television markets to build twenty-channel capacity systems which contained at least four available access channels for use by the public, government officials, educators and
paying lessors.3 9 Under the mandatory access rules, cable operators had no control over the content of the programs on the four
4°
access channels.
After receiving numerous complaints, the FCC in 1976 modified its mandatory access rules. 41 The new rules applied to any
system with 3,500 subscribers or more, rather than limiting the
applicability of the rules to the top 100 television markets. 42 In
addition, the new rules required cable operators to write access
rules for users and also to provide free access for five years to
43
educators and local government officials.
In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,44 the Supreme Court held that
the FCC's mandatory access rules were invalid. The Court accepted the Commission's argument that the FCC had broad
authority to promulgate rules such as the mandatory program
scribers. These decisions have been made in light of local circumstances.
we think, is as it should be.
Id. at 1105-06.
37. Id.
38. Cable Television Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3252, 36 F.C.C.2d 141, aff'd on
reconsideration,37 Fed. Reg. 13,848, 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972).
39. Id. at 3289, 36 F.C.C.2d at 240-41.
40. Id.
41. Report and Order, Cable TV Capacity and Access Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294,
reconsiderationdenied, 62 F.C.C.2d 399 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Access Requirements].
The FCC continued to adhere to the rules' underlying premise that because cable television utilizes broadcast signals, it should help promote the goals of a national communications system. Such goals include "the promotion of diversity in television programming ....
aidling] the function of democratic institutions, and improv[ing] the informa-

tional and educational communications resources of cable television communities." Id. at
296. One commentator has argued that the economic impact of these rules was slight,
and the FCC's rules should have been upheld by the Court. Shoenberger, supra note 14,
at 129.
42. Access Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d at 302.
43. Id. at 314-16. These requirements ignored warnings given by cable system operators which indicated that the cost of providing free access would be prohibitive. In addi-

tion, the operators had contended that the cost of complying with these requirements
would result in a 65% increase in subscriber rates. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Major
Market Cable TV, 51 F.C.C.2d 519, 519-20 (1975).
44. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
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origination rules approved of by the Court in United States v.
Midwest Video Corp.45 The Court, however, reasoned that the
mandatory access rules exceeded the FCC's authority because
they "plainly impose[d] common-carrier obligations 46 on cable
operators." 47 The Court noted that Congress had forbade imposing common-carrier obligations on broadcasters because Congress did not want broadcasters' editorial control over their programs hindered. 4 3 The Court reasoned that Congress's intent to
assure journalistic freedom was equally applicable to the pro49
gramming of CATV operators.
Although the Court in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. limited the
FCC's authority to regulate cable television, the Commission
continues to possess the authority to promulgate rules for distant
' 51
signal importation 50 and to enforce the "fairness doctrine.
Most importantly, it remains the FCC's responsibility to regulate
cable television to promote the goals of broadcasting diversity
52
and local origination.
STATE REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION IN ILLINOIS

In Illinois, there is no direct statutory authority which permits
state regulation of cable television. Furthermore, there is no statute which provides for regulation of broadcasters. Regulation of
45. Id. at 698-99.
46. Common carrier obligations require a company to deal with the public on a firstcome first-serve basis. The Court described a common carrier in the context of communication service as "one that 'makes a public offering to provide [communications facilities]
whereby all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing.' " Id. at 701 (quoting
Report and Order, Industrial Radiolocation Service, Docket No. 16,106, 5 F.C.C.2d 197,
202 (1966)). The Court further stated that "Ia] common carrier does not 'make individual
ized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal."' Id. (quoting
National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976)).
47. Id.
48. Id. The Court emphasized that § 3(h) of the Act requires that "a person engaged
in ... broadcasting shall not ... be deemed a common carrier." Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(h) (1976)).
49. Id. at 703-04. For an in-depth analysis of this decision, see Note, supra note 14.
50. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
51. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209 (1982). The fairness doctrine has been explained as follows:
"[U]nder the Fairness Doctrine broadcasters are responsible for providing the listening
and viewing public with access to a' balanced presentation of information on issues of
public importance." Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
112 (1973).
52. 440 U.S. at 700. The FCC's rules and regulations attempt to have cable television
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common carriers and public utilities is exclusively vested in the
53
Illinois Commerce Commission.
In Illinois-Indiana Cable Television Association v. Illinois
Commerce Commission,5 4 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
cable television was not a public utility under the Public Utilities
Act. The ICC. had asserted jurisdiction over cable television
companies concluding that they were public utilities under the
statute.5 5 The ICC, after considering the evidence, found that
cable television, as a system of delivery signals, presented significant service overlap with the telephone and utilized financing
techniques that paralleled the telephone industry.5 6 Because of
the similarity between cable television companies and telephone
companies which are public utilities under the Public Utilities
Act, the ICC concluded that cable television was subject to its
57
jurisdiction.
The Illinois Supreme Court refused to defer to the ICC's extensive findings of fact that cable television fell within the statutory
meaning of telephone communications. 58 Instead, the court relied
on the common meanings of television and telephone because
"'the statutory language . . . under consideration [was] not
exceedingly technical in nature, such that only specialized agencies [might] be thought to understand it."'9 The court concluded
that the plain meaning of the term "television" was vastly dis-

operations conform with the standards governing television broadcasting. Federal regulations provide for registration statements, broadcast signal specifications, non-duplication protection and syndication exclusivity, cablecasting, general operating requirements, forms and reports, diversification of control, and technical standards for cable
television systems. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1-.29, 76.51-.617 (1982).
53. Public Utilities Act, li.i.. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 9 (1981). Under the Act, a public
utility is defined as follows:
[E]very corporation, company, association, joint stock company or association,
firm, partnership or individual, their lessees, trustees, or receivers appointed by
any court whatsoever that owns, controls, operates or manages, within this
State, directly or indirectly, for public use, any plant, equipment or property
used or to be used for... any franchise, license, permit or right to engage in ...
the transmissionof telegraph or telephone messages between points within this
State.
Id. § 10.3 (emphasis added).
54. 55 Il. 2d 205, 302 N.E.2d 334 (1973).
55. Id. at 205, 302 N.E.2d at 334.
56. Id. at 207-08, 302 N.E.2d at 335-36.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 221, 302 N.E.2d at 342.
59. Id. at 212, 302 N.E.2d at 338 (quoting Minnesota Microwave, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 291 Minn. 241, 245, 190 N.W.2d 661, 665 (1971)).
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tinguishable from the term "telephone" and therefore rejected
60
the ICC's assertion of jurisdiction.
The court erroneously ignored the ICC's findings of fact regarding the similarities between telephone communications and cable
television by summarily stating that the determination of the
statutory term telephone messages was a legal issue. Although
the interpretation of statutory words such as telephone messages
is a legal question to be determined by the court, the court should
have considered the ICC's findings of fact regarding the meaning of the term cable television when it made the legal determination of whether the term fell within the statutory meaning of
61
telephone messages.
In declining to include cable television within the statutory
term telephone messages, the court set a precedent which is dangerous to the general principles of appellate review of administrative decisions. Traditional deference to administrative expertise and competence 62 would quickly deteriorate if courts freely
ignored the factual determinations an agency rendered by classifying such determinations as legal issues and ignoring the agency's factual findings when making its legal conclusions.
60. Id. at 221, 302 N.E.2d at 342. Other states have also recognized that a utility
commission's jurisdiction over cable television requires clear constitutional and/or statutory authority. E.g., Television Transmission, Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 47 Cal. 2d 82,
301 P.2d 862 (1956). For states that have enacted legislation expressly conferring jurisdiction on their utility commissions to regulate cable television, see Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 1150
(1975).
61. In the same year that Illinois-Indiana Cable Television was decided, the Illinois
Supreme Court in Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 461,
303 N.E.2d 364 (1973), correctly deferred to the ICC's factual determinations when the
court interpeted the meaning of certain statutory words.
62. In recognition of the ICC's expertise, a court's review of the findings of fact made
by the Commission is statutorily limited. The Public Utilities Act provides in pertinent
part:
The findings and conclusions of the [ICC] on questions of fact shall be held

prima facie to be true and as found by the [ICC]; and a rule, regulation, order or
decision of the [ICC] shall not be set aside unless it clearly appears that the
finding of the Commission was against the manifest weight of the evidence....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 12 (1981). The reasoning underlying this deference is clear.
The ICC, as the trier of fact, is placed in a better position to assess the credibility of the
witnesses and weigh the evidence. See Kessell v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 56 Ill.
App. 3d 485, 491, 371 N.E.2d 1210, 1214 (1978). Mere differences of opinion between a
court and a commission concerning the credibility of witnesses or testimony proffered is
insufficient to reverse a commission's decision. Keen v. Police Bd., 73 Ill. App. 3d 65, 71,
391 N.E.2d 190, 195 (1979). Furthermore, the party seeking to overturn a commission's
decision shoulders a heavy burden of proving the decision was erroneous. Missouri
Pacific R.R. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n ex rel. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 401 Ill. 241, 248,
81 N.E.2d 871, 875 (1948).
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Perhaps, in light of the technological advancements made
since the Illinois-IndianaCable Television decision was rendered
in 1973, the Illinois Supreme Court should reconsider whether
cable television falls within the Public Utilities Act's definition
of telephone messages. For instance, cable television signals
may now be transmitted over telephone lines. Furthermore, telephones can transmit messages from cable television stations to
hook-ups inserted on television sets or even on personal computers. The Bell Operating Companies, the purveyors of local intraexchange telephone service, are also considering whether to
build and own cable television systems as a means of developing
new sources of revenue. 63 Additionally, teletext and videotext
services, recently approved by the FCC, utilize telephone wires to
link the home television screen to central data banks. 64
Even though the Illinois-Indiana Cable Television decision
established that the ICC cannot directly regulate cable television, the ICC can invoke jurisdiction indirectly. In Cable Television Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission,65 twenty-four cable
television companies sought declaratory and injunctive relief
asserting that the ICC had no authority to regulate pole attachment agreements entered into between public utilities and CATV
operators. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the argument of
the cable television companies. The court noted that the Communications Act of 1934 authorized states to establish the rates,
terms and conditions of pole attachments. 66 The court determined that the Illinois legislature had chosen to confer this
power on the ICC by requiring public utilities to acquire ICC
approval and consent before leasing any part of their
67
equipment.

63. Holsendolph, Bell Units Weighing Cable TV Rule, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1983, at D1,
col. 2. For an analysis of the effect of divestiture on the financial integrity of the Bell
Operating Companies, see Tannenbaum & Hurst, The AT & T Agreement: Reorganization of the Telecommunications Industry & Conflicts with Illinois Law, 15 J. MAR. L.
Riv. 563 (1982). For an analysis of the feasibility of competition between the local phone
companies and cable franchises, see Noam, Towards an Integrated Communications
Market: Overcoming the Local Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. CONI. L.J. 209
(1982).
64. Landro, Changing Channels, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
65. 82 Ill. App. 3d 814, 403 N.E.2d 287 (1980).
66. Id. at 818, 403 N.E.2d at 289.
67. Id.
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The cable companies alternatively argued that even if the ICC
could regulate the pole attachment agreements, the ICC, when
determining whether to approve the agreements, could only consider the interests of the patrons of the utilities and not the economic impact of the agreements on cable subscribers. 6 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the Public Utilities Act
requires the ICC to consider whether the public will be convenienced in determining whether to approve the lease of property
owned by a public utility. 69 The court construed the term public
to include not only the patrons of the utility, but the general public, which includes cable television subscribers. 70 Therefore, the
court concluded that when approving pole attachment agree
ments, the ICC should consider the interests of cable television
subscribers as well as other interests at stake. 71 Thus, although
the ICC may not directly regulate cable television, it may do so
indirectly because of its power to disapprove of pole attachment
agreements entered into between public utilities and cable operators which the ICC finds would not be in the best interest of the
public and the cable television subscribers.
MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION
FCCFranchisingGuidelines
Until the FCC asserted jurisdiction over cable television in the
mid-1960's, municipalities regulated the industry. A municipality
would grant a cable television system an exclusive franchise 72 by
exercising its inherent power to control the city's streets, side-

68.
69.
70.
71.

72.

Id.
Id. at 819, 403 N.E.2d at 289.
Id.

Id.
In the context of state and local government law, the term "franchise" is defined

as follows:
[A] grant of authority by a local or state government ... to do certain things
which a corporation or individual otherwise may not do; more specifically, it is
a grant of authority to use the public streets, alleys, and ways, on a more than
temporary basis, for the purpose of carrying on a business in the nature of a
public utility ....
Having the power to require and grant the franchise, the
municipality can attach conditions to its exercise and thereby impose obligations of a regulatory nature on the cable system.
Barnett, State"Federal,and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW.
685, 685 n.3 (1972).
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walks, and public ways. 73 Franchises, however, were not always
awarded in the public interest. Cable television franchises were
often granted on the basis of bribes and kickbacks received by
local governmental officials. 74 Many cable franchises were
awarded to the only bidder and in some cases cities awarded
franchises without even holding public hearings. 75 In addition,
many cities failed to recognize the complexities of cable television regulations and therefore did not require franchises to add
76
technological improvements.
In an attempt to correct the disarray present in exclusive
municipality franchising, the FCC introduced minimum guidelines for local franchising. 77 However, with the exception of the
mandatory rules governing franchise fees, compliance with these

73. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prod. v. City of Indianapolis, 536 F. Supp. 371, 379 (S.D.
Ind. 1982); Illinois Broadcasting Co. v. City of Decatur, 96 Ill. App. 2d 454, 238 N.E.2d 261
(1968) (a cable system, or any such business, needs city council authorization to lay wire).
The first amendment of the United States Constitution does not preclude cities from regulating CATV. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
the exercise of First Amendment rights have long been recognized." United States Labor
Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 1980). The restrictions may not extend, however, to proscribe content if such content is constitutionally protected speech. E.g., Village
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Moreover, the restrictions must be justified by a substantial
governmental interest, and be narrowly, reasonably, and precisely tailored to meet such
interest. E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
74. In Johnstown, Pennsylvania, the mayor, a former councilperson, and a current
councilperson were indicted for accepting bribes in exchange for their votes for a particular franchise. The mayor and former councilperson pled guilty to the charge of conspiracy to use an interstate facility to further illegal activity. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d
272, 276-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973). The current councilperson was
convicted of the same charge at trial. United States v. McKee, 462 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1972).
See also Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633 (D. Alaska
1982) (The City of Anchorage brought a civil RICO action against the officers of a cable
company who were convicted of bribing city officials to gain a franchise).
75. See, e.g., CROSSED WIRES: CABLE TELEVISION IN NEW JERSEY, A REPORT BY THE
CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF PUBI.IC ISSUES 22, 46 (1971) (recounting two instances where

cities awarded 25-year exclusive franchises without soliciting any other bids); Barnett,
supra note 72, at 771-84 (recounting that Buffalo awarded an exclusive 15-year franchise
without seeking competitive bids or conducting public hearings).
76. See Note, supra note 8, at 746. Of course, now that many franchises are expiring,
cities may, within FCC rules, place heavy demands on franchises. However, the economic attractiveness of urban franchises is dwindling, at least temporarily, with low
demand and high starting costs. See Landro, supra note 64, at 1, col. 6.
77. Cable Television Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3252, 3275-77, 36 F.C.C.2d 141,
204-10, aff'd on reconsideration,37 Fed. Reg. 13,848, 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972). The FCC
believed that cable television service had "tended to develop on a 'non-competitive,
monopolistic basis in areas served' thus denying cable subscribers 'the normal protection
afforded consumers by providing a choice between alternative suppliers."' Id. at 3252, 36
F.C.C.2d at 145 (quoting Rulemaking and Inquiry. 33 Fed. Reg. 19,028, 15 F.C.C.2d 417
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guidelines is voluntary. 78 The guidelines were designed to provide uniformity, competition and public participation in the local
franchise process. The minimum standards include guidelines
for public proceedings, construction timetables, franchise duration, 79 installation and subscription rates, compliance procedures
80
and franchise fees.
The FCC standards specify that the franchise fee charged by
the grantor shall not exceed three percent of the grantee's gross
revenues per year from the community. 81 The FCC, however,
will waive the three percent fee limitation and allow a franchise
fee as high as five percent of gross revenues if two showings are
made to the FCC.8 2 The grantee must first show that the fee will
not interfere with federal regulatory goals. The franchising authority must then show the FCC that the fee is "appropriate in light
83
of the planned local regulatory program."
The City of Chicago has enacted an ordinance to regulate
cable television communications.8 4 The ordinance purports to
adhere to the mandatory franchise fee standards. The ordinance
levies on grantees a "franchise fee of not less than five percent
(5%) of its annual gross revenues... and other forms of compensation including, but not limited to, a charge on certain sources
of revenue and an interest in ownership or profits."8 5 Further,
the ordinance provides that the City of Chicago "retains the
right to fix rates for users, regular subscriber service, and all
other services to the extent permitted by law or FCC rules and
regulations that are just, reasonable and compensatory (assum86
ing efficient and economical management)."

(1968)). The FCC guidelines were intended to remedy this situation.
78. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1982).
79. The FCC suggests a franchise duration maximum of 15-years. Id. The Sloan
Commission has recommended a 10-year period. ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF
ABUNDANCE, REPORT OF THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS

154 (1971).

80. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1982).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 113.1-1 to -60 (1982). Significantly, no ordinance regulates television broadcasters utilizing microwave discs, scramblers and/or
direct broadcast satellites. The cable television ordinance empowers the Chicago City
Council and the Chicago Cable Commission to grant, revoke, and renew franchises;
evaluate grantees' performances; and levy and assess franchise, subscriber and user fees.

Id.
85.
86.

Id. § 113.1-21(A).
Id. § 113.1-21(E).
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Chicago has also adopted many of the voluntary minimum
guidelines recommended by the FCC to promote uniformity,
competition and public participation in the local franchise process. These include holding public hearings on legal, financial,
technical, construction and other franchising details. 87 The ordinance also follows the FCC recommendation that both initial
88
and renewed franchising periods shall not exceed fifteen years.
Chicago's regulation of cable television raises several problems. First, the City's statutory authority to regulate the industry
extends only to "license, franchise and tax."89 The ordinance,
however, attempts to vest the City with additional power to set
subscriber and user rates. 90 Such ratemaking authority exceeds
traditional municipal functions, and may also extend beyond the
City's regulatory competence. 9 1 Moreover, because the Illinois
Supreme Court has determined that cable television systems are
not public utilities under the Public Utilities Act, rate regulation
of cable television by any state or local governmental authority
92
is anomalous.
A second deficiency of Chicago's regulatory scheme is its franchise fee which provides that the City will receive five percent of
the gross revenues of a cable television system coupled with
"other forms of compensation" from the cable television system,
including a potential share of the profits.9 3 The FCC limited
municipal franchise fees to three percent of gross revenues in
response to potential and actual municipal abuses of cable television franchises. 94 Prior to the adoption of the FCC rules, muni-

87.
88.
89.

Id.§ 113.1-13.
Id. § 113.1-6.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-11 (1981).

90.

CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 113.1-21(E) (1982).

91. The City possesses neither the staff, resources or tradition to attempt to regulate
rates. The ICC is the exclusive governmental regulator of public utility rates in Illinois.
IL. REV.STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 9 (1981).
92. Rate regulation under state authority is normally justified only when the body
being regulated is a public utility. Moreover, the Chicago ordinance requires the ratemaking body to consider whether the franchise possesses "efficient and economical
management." CHICAGO, hILL.
MUNICIPALCOIE, § 113.1-21(E) (1982). This standard is nebulous and subject to potential abuse.
93. The ordinance states that in addition to 5% of the franchise's gross revenues, the
City is entitled to "other forms of compensation including but not limited to a charge on
certain sources of revenue and an interest in ownership and profits." Id. § 113.1-21(A).
94. 47. C.F.R. § 76.31 (1982). Franchises which were granted prior to 1972 are exempt
from the fee restrictions for a period of 15-years from the date of the grant of the original
franchise or until the end of the franchise period, whichever occurs first. Id.
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cipalities often extracted exorbitant fees from cable television
companies, finding cable television franchises to be a new-found
"urban oil well under .

.

. city streets." 95 These excessive fees

were passed on to subscribers or absorbed by the companies
96
themselves.
To justify a fee in excess of three percent, the FCC requires
"both a full description of the special regulatory program contemplated and a full accounting of estimated costs. 97 Failure to
precisely specify the costs of municipal regulation raises a presumption that the fee in excess of three percent will be used for
the municipality's general treasury.98 If this presumption is not
rebutted, the extra fee will be stricken as null and void. 99
The FCC has approved fees in excess of three percent for several regulatory schemes. For example, the Commission has
authorized fees higher than three percent when the regulatory
jurisdiction established a separate commission to monitor franchisees' operations, resolve operator-customer disputes, or advise
the city council. 100 However, a municipality by merely claiming
that its regulatory scheme requires additional personnel will not
obtain FCC approval for fees higher than three percent. The
three percent fee, the FCC reasons, should cover additional per10 2
sonnel,' 0 1 and even consultants.
95. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1973, at 73, col. 6 (quoting John Lindsey, then Mayor of New
York).

96. The FCC noted that municipal abuse of the fee process was widespread. Some
municipalities exacted fees of up to 36% of gross revenues. Cable Television Report and

Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3252, 3276, 36 F.C.C.2d 141, 209, aff'd on reconsideration,37 Fed. Reg.
13,848, 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972). The FCC stated that such high fees amount to "an indirect
and regressive tax on cable subscribers." Id. Such fees, moreover, hindered the FCC's
goals of economic stability and competition.
97. Clarification of the Cable Television Rule and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Inquiry, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, 203 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Clarification]. See also Warner
Cable Communications Corp., CSR-1725 (FCC, Apr. 8, 1983). The regulatory schemes of
some municipalities involve complex and intricate programs, supervision, and scrutiny.
Municipalities serving the larger television markets typically require more comprehensive schemes, and face more problems. See, e.g., Hawkeye Cablevision, Inc., 46 F.C.C.2d
555 (1974); General Television, 47 F.C.C.2d 60 (1974); Comment, Community Antenna
Television: The Case for Municipal Control,22 WAYNE L. REV. 99, 113 (1975).
98. See City of Mesa, Arizona, CSR-2068 (FCC, July 6, 1983).
99. If the FCC declares that a fee is excessive, the fee above 3% will be stricken. No
new certification, however, is required. Clarification, 46 F.C.C.2d at 201.
100. See, e.g., T.C. Indus., Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 462 (1976); General Television, 47 F.C.C.2d
60 (1974).
101. See, e.g., Champaign-Urbana Communications, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 78 (1974); Teleprompter Cable Communications Corp., 39 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1206 (1977).
102. Teleprompter Cable Communications Corp., 39 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1206 (1977).
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The FCC also closely scrutinizes requests for fees above three
percent when the additional amount covers expenses other than
those required to regulate the cable system. For example, the
FCC will only approve an extra fee for public access programming if such programming adheres to strict first amendment
safeguards and remains part of the larger, overall regulatory
design. 10 3 Also, the FCC will strike down any extra service
package requirement unrelated to the regulation of cable television on the theory that it operates as a payment-in-kind if it
10 4
causes the fee to exceed three percent.
Chicago can justify its five percent franchise fee. The City's
intricate regulatory program, large market area, and the maintenance of the Cable Commission and the City Council Committee on Cable Regulation warrants the excess fee. However, the
FCC will reject any attempt to enforce the provision of the City's
ordinance which extracts "other forms of compensation"1 0 5 in
06
addition to the five percent fee as an excessive payment-in-kind. 1
Paradoxically, the FCC franchise fee rules actually encourage a
city to seek a three percent fee. Any fee which is three percent or
less may be appropriated to a city's general treasury and allocated to any project.10 7 A fee in excess of three percent, however,

But see, Theta Cable, 47 F.C.C.2d 123 (1974).
103. Clarification, 46 F.C.C.2d at 207. The FCC fears that the temptation for government censorship is great. Report and Order, 42 Fed. Reg. 52,404, 52,412 (1977). The Commission has struck down fee requests when the public access plan has failed to provide
adequate procedural safeguards for first amendment rights. Jerrold Polinsky, 39 RAD.
REG. 2d (P&F) 221 (1976).
104. Clarification, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, 204-07 (1974). The FCC has reasoned that
payments-in-kind are too economically oppressive because they divert resources from
more essential services. Id. See, e.g., International Telemeter, 47 F.C.C.2d 469 (1974). (A
municipality ordered a franchise to wire an entire school and other public buildings. The
cost exceeded 3% of gross subscriber revenues. The FCC thus denied permission to lay the
wires because the wiring constituted a payment-in -kind).
However, an extra service package which causes a franchise fee to exceed 3% will not
be struck down if the FCC determines that the extra service package is not clearly excessive and that it has the potential to benefit all cable users. Clarification, 46 F.C.C.2d at
205-06.
105. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 113.1-17(A) (1982).
106. Because the "other forms of compensation" are in addition to the 5% franchise
fee, any attempt to enforce this provsion would conflict with the FCC franchise fee rules.
47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1982).
107. A municipality which charges a franchise fee of 3% or lower need not justify any
amount of the fee to the FCC. Id.
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requires a city to spend the entire amount, not just the amount in
08
excess of three percent, on cable regulation.
Antitrust Liability
Chicago's ordinance which governs its regulation of cable television also raises antitrust problems. In Metro Cable Co. v.
CA TV of Rockford, Inc.,109 an unsuccessful cable television franchise applicant sued the successful applicant, its owner and
officers, the mayor, and an alderman under the Sherman Act,
challenging the award of an exclusive franchise territory. The
plaintiff conceded that the City of Rockford was immune from
antitrust liability, and therefore never alleged a cause of action
against the City." 0 The plaintiff claimed that the defendants
engaged in concerted activities to induce govermental actions
that had an anticompetitive effect."' The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs complaint. The court stated that the anticompetitive
actions of the City were not subject to the Sherman Act, and
therefore efforts aimed at inducing the City to act anticompetitively were likewise immune from the Sherman Act. 112 The court
reasoned that a municipality acting pursuant to legislative direction is cloaked with antitrust immunity under the doctrine enun13
ciated by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.
In Parker v. Brown," 4 the Supreme Court upheld a statewide
regulatory system for the raisin industry stating that the regulatory system was not pre-empted by the Sherman Act. The Court

108. Clarification, 46 F.C.C.2d at 203. One might argue that excessive fees should be
approved if they result from competitive bidding and the give-and-take of the negotiation
process. Cities' greed, furthermore, is tempered by the fear of "killing the goose that lays
the golden egg" - excessive fees could bankrupt grantees and deprive the cities of
revenue in the long run. Despite arguments to the contrary, the FCC has steadfastly
refused to approve any fee exceeding 5% for post-1972 franchises. One approach a city
could consider in order to obtain the concomitant benefits of a low fee percentage and
high fees would be to levy a low fee percentage and inflate anticipated revenues in
some future time period. For example, Chicago is considering levying fees for the first
year of the franchise, based on the projected revenues of the fifteenth year, fees for the
second year based on the fourteenth year, etc. By simply inflating the anticipated
revenues in year fifteen, a city can inflate the fees it is owed.
109. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
110. Id. at 228-29 (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at224.
112. Id. at 229.
113. Id. at 227-29
114. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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reasoned that principles of federalism, absent a contrary expression of congressional intent, permit a state to regulate commercial activity within its borders. The Court stated: "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states
are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress."'1 5 The Court concluded that "[t]he
Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives
no hint that it was intended to restrain state action." ' 1 6 However,
two subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court limit the extent
of the Parkerdoctrine's applicability to municipalities." 17
The Court restricted municipal antitrust immunity in City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 118 The Supreme Court
held that city-owned public utilities were not exempt from the
antitrust laws unless a state had authorized the city to act anticompetitively. The Court stated that the Parkerdoctrine "exempts
only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant
to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopolistic public service." 1 9 According to the Court, if a legislature
authorizes the municipalities of its state to regulate a particular
area, it can be inferred that the legislature contemplated that the
municipalities might regulate anticompetitively.' 20 The Court
affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's decision to

115. Id. at 350-51.
116. Id. at 351. Since the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has continually affirmed states' inherent powers to regulate the health and safety of their citizens
through clearly articulated and directly supervised statutory systems. In New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978), the Supreme Court reversed a decision
which held that a state statute regulating retail motor vehicle dealerships was pre-empted
by the Sherman Act. The Court held: "The dispositive answer is that the [state's] regulatory scheme is a system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed,
designed to replace unfettered business freedom.... The regulation is therefore outside
the reach of the antitrust laws under the 'state action' exemption." Id. at 109. Cf. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980) (The
Court held that the State regulatory statute was pre-empted by the Sherman Act, reasoning that although the intent to displace competition was clearly expressed, the State did
not directly supervise the regulation and thus "failed to meet the second requirement for
Parkerimmunity." Id. at 105.).
117. See infra notes 118-21, 123-39 and accompanying text.
118. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
119. Id. at 413 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 415 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).

52
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remand the case to the trial court for a determination of whether
the state legislature contemplated that Louisiana municipalities
121
would regulate public utilities anticompetitively.
The Court in City of Lafayette did not resolve whether municipal activities need to receive state legislative direction or mere
authorization to enjoy antitrust immunity. The Court also did
not consider whether a municipality should receive antitrust
immunity for activities such as cable television that the municipality franchises and regulates, but in which it has no proprietary interest. Subsequent to the decision in City of Lafayette,
courts determined that municipalities were immune from antitrust violations based on a finding of general or implied authority from their state legislatures. Courts also exempted municipalities from Sherman Act liability for their non-proprietary activi1 22
ties as well as their activities based on home rule amendments.
The Supreme Court further narrowed the scope of municipal
immunity from antitrust violations in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder. 23 In this case, a municipality pursuant to its extensive home rule authority enacted an ordinance
which precluded a cable franchise grantee from expanding its
service territory. The grantee sought to enjoin the City from
enforcing its restrictive ordinance by alleging that it violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 24 The trial court held that the
Parker doctrine did not shield the municipality from antitrust
25
liability and therefore granted the injunction.
On review, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed,
holding that a municipality could only be subject to antitrust
violations if it had a proprietary interest in the activity regulated. 2 6 The court distinguished City of Lafayette, noting that

121. Id. at 417 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
122. See generally Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95
HARV. L. REv. 435 (1981). Typically, proprietary activities include city-owned businesses,
e.g., bus companies, while non-proprietary functions include activities dedicated solely to

public service, e.g., police protection. However, determining the difference between proprietary and non-proprietary functions has raised difficulties. See 2 E. MCQUILLEN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.05 (3d ed. 1979).

123. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, in pertinent part:
"Every contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states... is declared to be illegal."
125. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo.),
rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
126. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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City of Lafayette involved municipally operated revenue-producing utility companies, while in the instant case the municipality
had no proprietary interest in cable television franchising. 127 The
court stated that even if a municipality could be held liable for
anticompetitively regulating an activity in which it had no proprietary interest, the City of Boulder remained immune from
antitrust liability. The court reasoned that Colorado's home rule
amendment satisfied the requirement enunicated in City of
Lafayette that a municipality must receive sufficient authoriza128
tion from the state to act anticompetitively.
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision and
remanded the case. 129 The Court implicitly rejected the Tenth
Circuit's holding that a municipality could only violate the antitrust laws by anticompetitively regulating activities in which a
municipality had a proprietary interest. The Court stated that
the Parker doctrine was specifically limited to official action
directed or authorized by the state.' 30 In the Court's view,
exempting a municipality from antitrust liability for anticompetitive regulation of any activity without authorization from the
state would violate the principle that "we are a Nation of States,
a principle that makes no accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of States."'13 1 Therefore, the distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary activities would not bear on whether
an activity violated the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court also rejected the Tenth Circuit's alternative holding that Colorado's home rule amendment was sufficient authority by the State for municipalities to act anticompetitively in regulating CATV. 32 The Court stated that for a municipality to be cloaked with antitrust immunity its actions must
constitute either "the action of the [state] itself in its sovereign
capacity" or "municipal action in furtherance or implementation
33
of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.'
The Court held that the City of Boulder failed to meet either
requirement.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 708.
Id. at 707.
455 U.S. at 57.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 50 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 52-56.
Id. at 52.
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First, contrary to the City's contention, the State's home rule
amendment which vested Colorado municipalities with "every
power theretofore possessed by the legislature," did not empower
the City to act as the State in its sovereign capacity. 3 4 The
Court stated that because "[w]e are a nation not of 'city-states'
but of States," 13 5 a state must give specific direction to act in a
particular manner for municipalities to act as a state in its sovereign capacity. Second, the Supreme Court stated that Colorado's home rule amendment did not clearly articulate and affirmatively express that the legislature contemplated anticompetitive
regulation of cable television by Colorado municipalities.13 6 The
Court reasoned that the State's grant of local autonomy in its
home rule amendment reflected "precise neutrality."'' 3 7 In this
regard, the Court stated:
A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please
can hardly be said to have "contemplated" the specific
anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is
sought. Nor can those actions be truly described as "comprehended within the powers granted," since the term,
"granted," necessarily implies an affirmative addressing
of the subject by the State. The State did not do so here:
The relationship of the State of Colorado to Boulder's
13 8
moratorium ordinance is one of precise neutrality.
The Court concluded that because the City of Boulder's act of
prohibiting a cable operator from expanding its franchise was
not specifically contemplated by Colorado's home rule amendment, the City could not avoid antitrust liability by claiming
39
immunity under the Parkerdoctrine.1
Whether the City of Chicago would be subject to antitrust liability for granting exclusive cable television franchises depends
on the source of the City's authority to regulate CATV. Chicago,
unlike the City of Boulder, derives its authority to regulate cable
television from more than constitutional home rule powers. The
Illinois legislature, unlike Colorado's legislature, specifically

134. Id. (quoting Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, Colo., 618 P.2d 1374,
1381 (1980).
135. 455 U.S. at 54 (quoting Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630
F.2d 704, 717 (10th Cir. 1980) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982)).
136. Id. at 55.
137. Id.
138. Id. (emphasis in original).
139. Id. at 48.
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granted municipalities the authority to license, franchise and tax
cable television companies. 140 However, the Illinois legislature
did not empower municipalities to act as the State in regulating
cable television. The statute does not require municipalities to
regulate cable television at all, let alone in any particular manner.
The statute which uses the word "may" vests municipalities with
discretion whether to regulate.1 4 1 Thus, the actions of Illinois
municipalities in regulating cable television cannot be considered the actions of the State in its sovereign capacity.
Although Illinois municipalities cannot argue that they are
acting as the State when regulating CATV, they may assert that
they are immune from antitrust liability because the statute contemplates that municipalities will act anticompetitively in awarding franchises. To avoid antitrust liability based on the awarding of an exclusive cable television franchise, an Illinois municipality could argue that the legislature's failure to forbid municipalities from granting exclusive franchises while allowing them
to license, franchise and tax cable television indicates that the
legislature contemplated that municipalities would act anticompetitively. Certainly, the Illinois legislature must have been aware
that many municipalities grant exclusive franchises to cable
operators, and thus, it could be inferred that the legislature
approved of municipalities granting exclusive cable television
franchises.
However, courts cannot lightly infer that the legislature intended that the municipalities should act anticompetitively by granting exclusive franchises. Indeed, if the Illinois legislature intended
to authorize anticompetitive actions by municipalities and thereby immunize them from antitrust liability, it could have so

140.

The statute provides in pertinent part:
The corporate authorities of each municipality may license, franchise and tax
the business of operating a community antenna television as hereinafter defined.

The authority hereby granted does not include authority to license, franchise
or tax telephone companies subject to the jurisdiction of the Illinois Commerce
Commission or the Federal Communications Commission in connection with
the furnishing of circuits, wires, cables, and other facilities to the operator of a
community antenna television system.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-11 (1981). The terms franchise and license are sometimes
interpreted as interchangeable terms by Illinois courts. E.g., General Elec. Cablevision
Corp. v. City of Peoria, 8 Ill. App. 3d 948, 951, 291 N.E.2d 295. 298 (1972).
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-11 (1981).
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worded the statute. The regulatory powers granted municipalities to "license, franchise and tax" are not necessarily concomitants of monopoly regulation. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in
City of Boulder stated that there must be a "clear articulation
and affirmative expression" of the state's position regarding the
anticompetitive acts of a municipality to exempt it from antitrust
liability.1 42 In contrast, any approval by the Illinois legislature
regarding the granting of exclusive cable television franchises
by municipalities can only be shown by implication because the
statute does not address the awarding of exclusive franchises.
Although the City of Chicago might not be immunized from
antitrust liability, it may be able to raise a defense against antitrust claims. In City of Boulder, the Court held that the City was
143
not exempt under the Parker doctrine from antitrust liability.
The Court, however, stated that its decision did not reach the
issue of possible defenses a municipality could assert against the
claim that it acted anticompetitively. 144 Nevertheless, the Court
reiterated a statement it made in City of Lafayette that "[i]t may
be that certain activities, which might appear anticompetitive
when engaged in by private parties take on a different complexion when adopted by a local government." 145 This statement by
the Court may indicate that it believes a municipality should be
allowed to offer a rational justification as a defense for its
allegedly anticompetitive restraints which might be considered
per se illegal if they were engaged in by private parties.1 46 Such
a defense would recognize that municipalities, as legitimate
guardians of the public interests of their communities, may justifiably regulate activities anticompetitively for the orderly functioning of society. Municipalities should only be required to
show, as states show in challenges under the commerce clause,
that an anticompetitive municipal regulation bears a rational

142. 455 U.S. at 52.
143. Id. at 48.
144. Id. at 56 n.20.
145. Id. (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417).
146. The per se rule of antitrust liability contemplates a commercial, competitive
arena, with the violator's conduct containing no possible "redeeming virtue." Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). Municipal conduct, however, differs in intent and scope. Municipal conduct might be rationalized and tolerated
where private parties' behavior clearly would not be acceptable. Thus, in determining
whether municipal conduct violates the antitrust laws, competitive considerations should
be but one factor. The reasonableness of the anticompetitive restriction in light of a city's
goals and its political and economic situation should be the focus.
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relationship to a legitimate local purpose. 147 The regulation would
then be upheld if its local benefits outweighed its anticompetitive
effects.
By raising a public interest defense, a municipality should be
able to avoid any antitrust liability for regulation of activities
that are traditional municipal functions. A city could easily
show that anticompetitive regulation of traditional activities is
essential to promote public health, safety and welfare. Of course,
it would be more difficult for a municipality to justify its anticompetitive regulation of an activity which it has not traditionally believed it was compelled to regulate. 148 Therefore, whether
such a defense would aid municipalities which are haled into
court on claims of antitrust violations for granting exclusive
CATV franchises is unclear. Regulation of cable television franchises has not been considered a traditional municipal function.149 A municipality would have the burden of proving that its
arguably anticompetitive franchises were reasonable and served
a legitimate local purpose. A municipality would have to show
why the public interest would be better served with only one
CATV system serving an area, instead of allowing two or more
CATV systems to operate in the same territory. Thus, the municipality would have to demonstrate that economies of scale, construction oversight, subscriber and citizen convenience, and other
considerations of public welfare outweigh any evils inherent in
the municipality's anticompetitive exclusive franchises.

147. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). For example, municipalities often fix the number of taxicabs and the rates charged. Cities often grant exclusive
franchises for transportation, sanitation and other services. However, these activities
bear a rational relationship to the municipalities' traditional and inherent functions. But
see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (scrutinizing and invalidating the putative
relation between the challenged corporate takeover statute and local interests).
148. See Comment, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV L. REV. 62, 272 (1982); R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 405-07 (2d ed. 1977) (private corporations use the
political process to attain monopoly profits).
149. See, e.g., City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 40 (cable television regulation is not a traditional municipal function); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 389 (public utility regulation is
not a traditional municipal function).
The Chicago City Council has divided the City into five service territories, granting
non-exclusive franchises to a system operator in each territory. Exclusive territorial
arrangements may fall under per se antitrust attack. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596 (1972). But see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
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Although a municipality might be able to persuade a court
that anticompetitive regulation was justified, the major problem
this defense presents is the uncertainty of its success. The
Supreme Court has not provided any clear guidelines which
lower courts can utilize in evaluating when municipal conduct
will violate the antitrust laws. As a result, municipalities are
uncertain whether their anticompetitive regulation of an activity
will be considered justified in light of its purpose, or instead, will
leave the municipality exposed to potential treble damages. 150
Even if standards were developed to evaluate the legitimacy of
municipal anticompetitive conduct, the public interest defense is
inadequate because it exposes a municipality to a lawsuit each
time it decides to regulate an activity anticompetitively. 151 A

150. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) authorizes awarding treble damages to successful plaintiffs
in cases brought under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. However, declaratory and injunc-

tive relief, rather than treble damages might be the sole remedies available to compensate victims of anticompetitive municipal ordinances. The Supreme Court has recognized
that the punitive and deterrent purposes of the treble damages remedy against private
parties might not "be equally appropriate for municipalities." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S.
at 401-02; City of Boulder,455 U.S. at 56-57 n.20. Although the Supreme Court has left the
treble damage issue unsettled, the Court has held that punitive damages are not available against public entities in the absence of clear congressional intent. City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258-71 (1981) (but a city is liable for damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)). The eleventh amendment, however, permits suits for monetary
relief against cities. See. e.g., Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
151. Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in City of Boulder recognized that
the consequence of the Court's decision was that cities could be constantly "haled into
federal court in order to justify [their] decision that competition be replaced with regulation." 455 U.S. at 70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He argued that a city's decision to regulate an industry rather than allow competition should be given the same deference as a
state's decision to regulate an industry. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
stated that the pre-emption doctrine was an adequate safeguard against municipal abuse
of its power to replace competition with regulation. Id. at 68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Therefore, he concluded that absent pre-emption a municipality could regulate activities
anticompetitively.
The pre-emption doctrine is based on the supremacy clause. Federal statutory law will
pre-empt or override state law if Congress has specifically evinced an intent to displace
state law or if the state law directly conflicts with federal law and compliance with both
is impossible. Courts are reluctant to infer pre-emption, and will not pre-empt state law
unless "'the repugnance or conflict [is] direct and positive, so that the two acts could not
be reconciled or consistently stand together."' Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 11 (1937)
(quoting Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 142 (1902)). See also Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). "Federal regulation ... should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the
nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has
unmistakenly so ordained." DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (quoting Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)). See also City of Philadelphia
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municipality could be involved in costly litigation for each decision it makes to grant an exclusive CATV franchise. The threat
of such litigation and the potential liability may persuade city
councils not to grant exclusive CATV franchises even though
the councils believe that exclusive franchises are in the public's
interest.
Clearly, the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boulder
exposes Illinois municipalities to potential antitrust liability for
granting exclusive cable television franchises. The Illinois statute provides that a municipality may license, regulate and tax
municipalities. However, the statute does not provide specific
authorization for municipalities to regulate anticompetitively.
The Illinois legislature must take affirmative steps if it wants to
prevent Illinois municipalities from being subject to antitrust
liability. The legislature could amend the statute and specifically
authorize the State's municipalities to grant exclusive cable television franchises. In the alternative, the Illinois legislature could
empower the ICC to regulate the granting of cable television
franchises by municipalities.

CONCLUSION

The complex and interwoven maze of federal, state and local
schemes regulating the cable television industry have changed
dramatically over the last twenty-five years. The federal role has
grown considerably.15 2 Yet, the FCC has recognized the importance of state and local input and control. Although the Illinois
Supreme Court has determined that the ICC has no authority to
directly regulate the cable television industry, rapidly developing
technology may demand a role for the ICC. Moreover, in light of
the Supreme Court's decisions in City of Lafayette and in City of
Boulder, Illinois municipalities must now seriously re-examine

v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 n.4 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 132 (1978).
152. The federal role in regulating cable television may soon grow dramatically. The
Senate recently passed a bill which if enacted into law would significantly decrease
municipalities' regulatory authority over cable television and expand the authority of the
FCC. S.66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONe,. Ri:c. S8324-25 (1983). For example, the bill
sharply limits the franchisee's obligation to provide public access channels for local public service programs. The bill further restricts the state and local authorities from regulating rates and assessing franchise fees.

60
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their extensive regulation of cable television franchises. Municipalities may be forced to divert their resources from promoting a
viable, healthy regulatory scheme to protecting themselves from
antitrust litigation.

